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ABSTRACT 
BONSALL, P.W. (1979) Itiorosimulation of organised oar sharing - 
model predictions and policy implications. Leeds: University 
of Leeds, Inst. Transp. Stud., WP 114 (unpublished). 
!Chis paper presents the results of a range of tests of 
organised car sharing schemes. The performance of the schemes 
is predictedusinga sophisticated microsimulation model. A 
brief resume of the model is followed by a description of the 
tests and an analysis of their results. Conclusions are dram 
on the place of organised oar sharing within broader transport 
policies, the performance of the model when compared to the 
available empirical data and directions for public research. 
!he tests here presented include: a series of sensitivity 
analyses; tests of organisational strategies for car sharing 
schemes; tests of schemes in a variety of locations and at a 
variety of soales and finally a batch of tests which investigate 
the effect of major changes in the operating environment of car 
sharing schemes - changes in the price of fuel and public transport 
fares and the provision of parking space incentives for car sharers 
for example. 
MICROSIMULATION OF ORGANISED CAR SHARING - MODEL 
MODEL PREDICTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims of the study 
The primary objective of this study, which wss funded by TRRL 
on a contractual basis, was to provide a state of the art estimate 
of the likely performance of organised car sharing schemes in Britain 
The performance of schemes being expressed both operationally and 
in terms of their effect on the transport system as a whole - 
particularly their effect on public transport patronage and private 
vehicle mileage. 
It was hoped that some insight would be gained into the 
likely scale of these effects and how they might vary with changes 
in the nature of the schemes - changes in the location and size 
of the schemes and changes in their operating environment - the 
price of petrol and the provision of incentives to car poolers for 
example. 
1.2 Other studies 
Several studies have addressed themselves to the potential 
market for organised work journey car sharing (Tomlinson and Kellett 
1977, Vincent and Wood 1979, Cambridge Systematics Inc 1976, 
Atherton et a1 1976) but they have been concerned mainly with the 
potential and theoretical impact of car sharing given present 
journey-to-work patterns and characteristics. They have been able 
to contribute little to the estimation of likely impact because 
they could not estimate how many of the potential matches could or 
would be realised. Another line of research has been concerned 
with attitudes to car sharing in an attempt to understand the likely 
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response at the micro level (Marg&lilin-et al 1976, Dobson and Tischer 
1976, Levin et a1 1978, Tomlinson and Kellett 1978, Hawker Siddeley 
Dynamics 1977). This attitudinal work has provided valuable insights 
into the likely behviour of individuals but it is, in itself, not 
readily adapted for predictive purposes because it is concerned with 
individuals rather than populations. 
It was the aim of this project to bridge the gap between 
theoretical modelling and attitudinal investigation by developing 
a model which, while being based on the attitudes and consequential 
decisions of individuals, could take into account the availability 
and characteristics of potential partners and could thus predict 
the impact of a carsharing scheme at both the micro and the macro 
level. The form of model best suited to this task is microsimulation. 
The resulting model seeks to represent the interactions between 
individual decision makers and the manner in which an organised 
car sharing scheme would operate. 
1.3 Summary of the model 
1.3.1 The model and its calibration are fully described elsewhere 
(~onsall 1979b) but, for convenience, a summary is reproduced here. 
The model is based on microsimulation, a technique of 
computerised modelling within which the decision making process is 
replicated for individual decision makers within the system. These 
decision makers effectively become 'actors' within the modelled system. 
The model is driven by Monte Carlo type sampling. 
The simulation suite has three stages, each representing a 
distinct process in the establishment of an organised car sharing 
scheme. These three stages are represent.ed in figure 1.1. The 
first stage is concerned with the scope and intensity of the scheme 
being simulated and the decisions by members of the public to apply 
to join it. The second stage deals with the mechanics of matching up 
potential partners one with another. The third stage deals with the 
reactions of the participants in the scheme to their proposed partners. 
Figure 1 .l. OUTLm STRUCTURE .OF SIMULATION SUITE 
STAGE 11 
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An appendix t o  t he  main model t rans la tes  t he  performance of t he  scheme 
in to  i t s  effect  on cer ta in  c r i t i c a l  components of t he  t ransport  system. 
1.3.2 Microsimulation models require,  as a fundamental input,  a 
description of each of t he  actors i n  the  system of i n t e r e s t .  In  t he  
present case t h i s  means a description of a l l  180,000 peak period t r i p  
makers i n  our study area. Each of these individuals i s  uniquely 
iden t i f iab le  by h i s  iden t i ty  number and the  following charac te r i s t ics :  
- iden t i ty  of household t o  which he belongs 
- locat ion of residence (6  f igure  gr id  r e f )  
- locat ion of workplace ( 6  f igure  gr id  r e f )  
- sex 
- age ( 3  age bands) 
- employment category ( 3  types) 
- whether head of household 
- driving l icence tenure 
- normal mode of t r a v e l  t o  work (7 modes, evening mode 
i s  not constrained t o  equal morning mode.'. 49 modal 
combinations ) 
- whether car  needed for  business use 
- work hours 
- household telephone ownership 
- number of household members with a driving l icence 
- number of household members without a driving l icence 
- a random number seed for  Monte Carlo sampling. 
The descriptions of these individuals were synthesised on the bas i s  
of combined probabi l i t i es  from a household survey (WYTCONSULT 1976) 
and control  t o t a l s  from published census material  (OPCS a ,b) .  The 
method of synthesis is  described elsewhere (Bonsall and Champernowne, 
1979). 
1.3.3 The f i r s t  stage of t he  simulation su i t e  i t s e l f  allows the  
model user t o  define t h e  sca le  and locat ion of t he  car  sharing scheme 
t o  be tes ted .  This is achieved by defining a ' t a rge t  population' 
i n  terms of t h e i r  ~ s i d e n t i a l  ocation,  work locat ion or  some 
combination of t h e  two. The user is  a l so  able t o  specify a ' threshold 
of i n t e r e s t '  which may be taken t o  represent t he  i n t ens i ty  of an 
advertising campaign conducted among t h e  ta rge t  population. 
-. 
1.3.4 A calibrated choice model then replicates the decisions by 
each individual member of the target population whether or not to 
apply to join the postulated car sharing scheme. These choices are 
represented by the evaluation of binary logit models for each member 
of the target population. These models are regression transformations 
of the form: 
where Pn is the probability of that individual making a type 
n application to join the scheme (the various types 
of application being for pooling, driving or riding 
during the mornings and /or evenings ) . 
a. are the characteristics of the individual (see section 1.3.2) 
1 
x. are calibrated coefficients in 
The calibration of the coefficients x. was on the basis of In 
a field survey of expressed desire to join an organised car sharing 
scheme. Details of the calibration procedure and the field surveys 
are to be found elsewhere (Bonsall 1979a,b). 
The value of Pn derived for each individual in the target 
population is then compared with a random number drawn from a 
rectangular distribution between o and 1. The ratio of Pn to this 
number is taken to represent the individual's level of interest in 
joining an organised car sharing scheme. This interest is then compared 
with the 'threshold of interest' referred to in section 1.3.3 and if 
the individual's interest surpasses the threshold then a type n 
application from him is deemed made. 
When all members of the target population have been considered 
in this way, those deemed to have made applications are passed 
on to the next stage of the simulation. 
- 
1.3.5 The next stage of t he  simulation represents t h e  processing by 
the scheme organisers of a l l  applications received from t h e  t a rge t  
population. This processing involves t h e  preparation, f o r  each 
applicant,  of a l is t  of those of h i s  fellow applicants whose home 
location,  work locat ion,  work hours and type of appl icat ion make him 
a po ten t ia l  t r ave l l i ng  companion. There wil1,of course,be some 
applicants for  whom no potent ia l  partners can be found. 
1.3.6 The next stage of t he  simulation represents t h e  consideration 
by each applicant,who has received a l i s t  of po ten t ia l  partners,of 
the  worth t o  himself of entering an arrangement with any of those 
potent ia l  partners.  This consideration is  on the  bas i s  of a 
cal ibrated u t i l i t y  model of t h e  form: 
-- 
urn = c C an pm xm + epn + feepaid 
n=l  m = l  
where UAp is  t h e  u t i l i t y  of arrangement A t o  person P 
al...a a r e  character is t ics  of t he  arrangement A (see  t ab l e  1.2) 
n 
pl.. .pa a r e  character is t ics  of t he  person P (see t a b l e  1 .3)  
x 1  a re  cal ibrated components of u t i l i t y  associated 
xnm 
with any person with charac te r i s t ic  m engaging i n  
an arrangement with charac te r i s t ic  n. 
eip...e a r e  s tochast ic  elements associated with t h e  u t i l i t y  
nP 
t o  person P of an arrangement with charac te r i s t ic  n. 
feepaid is  t h e  net  sum of money, i f  any, passing t o  person P 
i n  respect of h i s  par t ic ipat ion i n  t h e  scheme. 
The ca l ib ra t ion  of t he  cumponents x was on t h e  bas i s  on a 
s e r i e s  of l i nea r  regression equations using data from a special  survey. 
The ca l ib ra t ion  proredure leaves a res idual  term which we take  t o  be normally 
dis t r ibuted and from which we sample t o  impart a unique ( s tochas t ic )  
element t o  each of our decision makers. The ca l ib ra t ion  process and 
surveys a r e  described elsewhere (Bonsall 1979a,b). 
The simulation model is  based on the  assumption t h a t  each 
applicant w i l l  consider a l l  the  potent ial  partners on h i s  l i s t  and 
w i l l  evaluate the  u t i l i t y  t o  himself of an arrangement with each of 
them. If any arrangements have a posit ive net u t i l i t y  t o  al l  
participants ( a f t e r  the  exchange of any fees) then the  dr iver  w i l l  
choose, from among them, tha t  one which has greatest  net u t i l i t y  t o  
him and tha t  arrangement is  deemed made. 
The model proceeds through each of the  applicants i n  turn  
and repl icates  t h e i r  evaluation of the  potent ial  t r ave l l ing  partners 
included on t h e i r  l i s t .  
1.3.7 The model does not attempt t o  derive a system optimum but t o  
optimise from the  point of view of the individual decision makers ( i n  
t h i s  respect it mirrors the  r e a l  world). Once two individuals have 
contracted t o  t r ave l  together they are both out of the  market the  
model predictions w i l l  therefore be a function of t h e  order i n  which 
bargains a re  struck. I n  the absence of any indication t o  the  contrary, 
the model assumes t h a t  bargains w i l l  be struck i n  a random order. 
L3.8 The model thus has two stochastic elements ( the  residual 
term i n  evaluation of u t i l i t i e s  and the order i n  which bargains 
are struck) and model r e su l t s  w i l l  therefore vary depending on which 
random number s t r ings  a re  used. I n  order t o  reach an average r e su l t  
the  model i s  therefore run f ive times during each t e s t  and mean 
values of the  various indicators a re  derived. ( A  confidence in terva l  
on t h i s  mean is  also produced). 
2 MODEL TESTS AND PREDICTIONS 
2.1 Introduction - scope and purpose of the  t e s t s  
The t e s t s  reported on i n  t h i s  paper a re  many and various, they 
include at one extreme, sens i t iv i ty  analysis of the  model and i ts  
cal ibrat ion and, a t  the  other extreme, scenario based policy tes t ing .  
Broadly, t he re  a r e  four groups of t e s t .  The f i r s t  group comprises 
a number of s ens i t i v i t y  t e s t s  designed t o  invest igate  t he  significance 
of some of t h e  assumptions made during the  design and ca l ib ra t ion  of 
t he  model su i t e .  The second group of t e s t s  examine how t h e  performance 
of organised car  sharing schemes are  affected by t h e  procedures 
adopted during t h e  formation of match lists. The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  group 
of t e s t s  should thus provide prac t ica l  guidance f o r  po ten t ia l  ca r  pool 
organisers. The t h i r d  group of t e s t s  i s  concerned with t h e  locat ion 
and in tens i ty  of t he  proposed ear  pooling schemes and should contribute 
t o  t he  formation of policy on the  design and locat ion of schemes. 
The f i n a l  group of t e s t s  comprise a speculative analysis  of t h e  probable 
effect  on car  pooling schemes of changes i n  t he  broader policy 
environment - changes i n  t ransport  costs  and parking-space incentives 
for  car poolers f o r  example. 
2.2 The conduct of t h e  t e s t s  
The general framework for  t he  t e s t s  reported on i n  t h i s  paper is 
adapted from the  pivotal  method of s ens i t i v i t y  analysis developed a t  
Leeds i n  a previous project  (Bonsall e t  a l ,  1977). Within t h i s  framework 
we begin by defining a pivotal  model run - using t h e  'most l i k e l y '  
value of model parameters and the'lbest estimate! values of model coefficients.  
Within t h e  other runs, the  model parameters and coeff ic ients  a r e  
systematically varied one by one - a l l  other parameters and coeff ic ients  
retaining t h e i r  default  values. Predictions by the  p ivo ta l  model 
are  then investigated i n  some depth before being used a s  t h e  yardst ick 
f o r  analysis of other model runs. 
I n  t h i s  way the  effect  of var ia t ion i n  t he  various model parameters 
and coeff ic ients  (some of which represent policy var iables)  can be 
compared with one another i n  magnitude and importance. 
Table 2.1 l ists t h e  model parameters and coef f ic ien ts  which w i l l  
be t e s t ed  i n  t he  present paper, and shows t h e i r  defaul t  values f o r  use 
on the  pivotal  model run. 
TABLE 2.1: PARMETERS AND COEFFICIFLX";' OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
(AND DEFAULT VALUES THEREOF) 
2.3 Output indicators 
In order t o  provide both fo r  sens i t iv i ty  analysis and f o r  policy 
t e s t ing  a variety of indicators have been included i n  the  model output. 
Name 
POPULATION 
HOMESIN 
WORKSIN 
THRESHOLD 
APPLYCOEFS 
BATSIZE 
NOONFORM 
TIMEWINDOW 
SEARCH 
MATCHCOEFS 
MAXFEE 
They are summarised i n  Table 2.2. The analysis package produces values 
and 90% confidence intervals  fo r  each indicator.  Some of the  indicators 
can, i f  necessary, a l so  be displayed graphically on a base map of t h e  
Function 
the  population base who act within 
the  simulation model 
defines which residence zones a re  
va l id  for applicants 
defines which employment zones a re  
va l id  fo r  applicants 
threshold of in te res t  
coefficients of decision t o  make 
an application 
number of applicants t o  be 
processed i n  current batch 
maximum number of potent ial  partners 
t o  be included on each match l i s t  
extent, i n  time, of search f o r  
partners 
extent and path of spa t i a l  search 
coeff ic ients  of u t i l i t y  of decision 
t o  match 
car running cost per 1/10 kilometer 
upon which dr iver  can base the  
maximum fee tha t  he may charge h i s  
passengers. 
study area. 
Default values 
'best '  synthesised 
population as of 
March 1979 
1 t h ru '  455 ( en t i r e  
study area)  
1-13 (cent ra l  Leeds) 
8 ( l e v e l  of publ ici ty  
= t h a t  of survey) 
'best '  cal ibrated 
values as of March 
1979 
1688 ( a l l  
applicants ) 
10 
+ 15 minutes 
s p i r a l  e l i p t i c a l  
search routine as 
a t  March 1979 
'best' cal ibrated 
values a s  of March 
1979 
unlimited 
The f i r s t  group of indicators,  p rof i les  of applicants and part ic ipants ,  
w i l l  be of par t icular  in te res t  t o  policy makers wishing t o  consider the  
d is t r ibut ional  effects  of a car sharing policy. The second group, 
- 
descriptions of operational performance of t he  scheme, w i l l  be of use t o  
t h e  organisers and managers of schemes. The t h i r d  group of indicators ,  
however, a r e  t he  ones of greates t  general i n t e r e s t ;  %hey describe the  
e f fec t s  t h a t  the  scheme would have on the  transport  system as  a whole. 
TABLE 2.2: IMPORTANT MODEL OUTPUTS 
* can be d i sp lwed on a base map. 
Type 
PROFIU OF 
AND 
PARTICIPANTS 
I N  EACH 
TYPE OF 
OPERATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 
OF THE 
SCHEME 
SYSTEM 
EFFECTS 
I 
Indicator 
- 
Location of hmes and workplaces* 
Length of journey t o  work 
Previous mode of t r ave l  t o  work . 
Sex, age and employment s t a tu s  
Household background (including cars owned, number 
of dr ivers ,  number of members and 
telephone ownership) 
Perceived u t i l i t y  of arrangements 
Fees changing hands 
Diversions and delays accepted 
Number of applicants f o r  each type of arrangement 
Number of applicants given a m a t ~ h  l i s t  
Number of arrangements i n i t i a t e d  
Computational cost of matching program 
Work journey public transport  patronage 
numbers of passengers l o s t  
passenger kilometres l o s t  
Private vehicle usage: 
kilometres saved 
kilometres driven within car  sharing 
arrangements* 
net saving i n  kilometres driven 
change i n  car  occupancies 
vehicles ' l iberated '  fo r  possible 
off-peak usage 
\ 
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3 DESCRIPTION, RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PIVOTAL MODEL RUN 
3.1 Introduction 
This section deals with t he  pivotal  model run  which provides t h e  
yardstick against which a l l  other runs w i l l  be considered. Subsequent 
sections w i l l  then consider t he  four groups of t e s t s  outl ined i n  
section 2.1. 
3.2 The ta rge t  population 
The default  values of parameters and coeff ic ients  which define the  
pivotal  model run were given i n  t ab l e  2.1. We a re  using t h e  'best  
estimate' model coefficients t o  run a policy t e s t  of an organised car  
sharing scheme open t o  all peak period work t r i p  makers employed i n  
cen t ra l  Leeds. This par t  of Leeds was chosen t o  be typ ica l  of s i t e s  
t h a t  might be considered for  a large municipally organised car  sharfng 
scheme. It is  a commercial area  (shops, offices and some service 
industry) approximately 1 kilometer by 2 kilometer. 
The locat ion of t h e  homes and workplaces of members of t h i s  t a r g e t  
population a re  shown i n  figure 3.1. Salient s t a t i s t i c s  r e l a t i ng  t o  t h i s  
population a re  given i n  column one of t ab l e  3.1. It is  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  
population i s  not a typical  of other groups of city-centre workers 
elsewhere i n  t h e  country. 
3.3 The applicants 
When the  decisions by each member of t h i s  t a rge t  population whether 
o r  not t o  apply t o  join t he  scheme were simulated we found t h a t  1688 
individuals applied t o  join  t he  scheme (=7.9% of t h e  t a r g e t  population). 
Column two i n  t a b l e  3.1 contains a description of these applicants and 
may be compared with the ta rge t  population as a whole which is  described 
i n  column one. 
Comparing these two columns we note t h a t  applications have been 
pa r t i cu l a r ly  forthcoming from: men, professional/managerial workers, 
ca r  dr ivers ,  and from persons with a home telephone, peak period journeys 
o r  longer than average journeys t o  work. Conversely, women, manual/shop 
f loor  workers, people over 50, car passengers, public t ransport  users ,  
people with no car  driving l icence o r  a short  journey t o  work and people 
from l a rge  households or  households w i t h  no telephone o r  cars  avai lable  
-. 
were par t icu la r ly  re luctant  t o  apply. 
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FIGURE 3.1 LOCATION OF TARGET POPULATION (PIVOTAL RUN) 
- EACH DOT IS AT THE HOME OF AN INDIVIDUAL TRIPMAKER 
- WORK LOCATION IS CROSS HATCHED 
,a u .- F 5. :; : x s s % B B Z z a E Z E E I z x , , , ,  
L=2 
Table 3.1 SUMMARY DESCRIFTION OF PARTICIPANTS AT VARIOUS STAGES OF 
THE PIVOTAL MODEL RUN (Leeds City Centre Scheme). 
* morning peak here defined as 0730 hrs + 0930 hrs, evening peak defined 
as 1600 hrs + 1800 hrs. 
Number 
% male 
%*manual/shop floor' workers 
% 'technical/clerical! workers 
% 'professional/managerial' workers 
% under 30 years old 
% 30 to 50 years old 
% over 50 years old 
% previously solo car drivers (mornings) 
% previously accompanied car drivers 
(mornings) 
% previously passengers (mornings) 
% previously public transport users 
I (mornings) 
I 
I % with no car available in hh. 
I 5 with 1 car available inhh. 1 % with 2+ cars available in hh. 
I % with household phone 
% with a car driving licence 
% from 1 person households 
% from 2 person households 
% from 3 person households 
% frum 4+ person households 
% needing car at work 
% whose morning journey = on-peak* 
% whose evening journey = on-peak* 
average length of journey to work (kms) 
Target 
population 
21,235 
53.12 
33.84 
34.26 
31.91 
31.50 
42.22 
26.28 
24.23 
8.64 
13.47 
47.83 
39.65 
49.53 
10. 82 
60.66 
50.55 
4.54 
30.28 
21.45 
43.73 
5.11 
77% 
64% 
5.97 
r 
Applicants 
1,688 
64.45 
12.62 
39.04 
48.34 
32.29 
45 - 32 
22.39 
40.4 
15.52 
5.81 
35.07 
26.05 
59.53 
14.42 
73.65 
74.76 
8.07 
40.00 
25.52 
26.73 
5.81 
8856 
79% 
9.10 
Successflil 
participants 
327 
65.46 
11.09 
41.77 
47.14 
30.20 
47.98 
21.82 
36.72 
13.82 
2.29 
41.10 
30.34 
56.04 
13.62 
72.2 
68.35 
7.97 
38.32 
26.69 
27.02 
n.a. 
94% 
83% 
9.26 
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Although middle class  males had a higher propensity t o  apply, t he  
proportion of l e s s  aff luent ,  predominantly public transport  using people 
i s  f a r  from insignificant because o f t h e i r  predominance i n  the  ta rge t  
population. This f a c t  is  reflected i n  the not inconsiderable proportion 
of applicants who desired t o  receive rather  than t o  give l i f t s .  
The type of applications made i s  shown i n  t ab le  3.2 from t h i s  t ab le  
we note the  following facts:  
. 
- Applications t o  receive l i f t s  were t h e  most numerous 
(561 + 117 + 18 = 696 = 38% of t o t a l  applications).  
Applications t o  give l i f ts  made up 32% of the t o t a l  and the  remaining 
30% were applications t o  pool. 
- Applications t o  pool and t o  take passengers came predominantly from 
people who were previously drivers.  
- Applications t o  receive l i f t s  came predominantly from public 
transport  users. 
- Applications t o  pool came from people with longer journeys t o  work 
than did applications t o  drive. Applications t o  r i d e  came from people 
with even shorter journeys t o  work. 
- Applications for  car  sharing a t  only one end of the  day came from 
people with shorter journeys than did applications t o  share a t  both 
ends of the  day. Evening-only applications were associated with 
par t icular ly short  journeys. 
3.4 The match lists 
The next stage i n  the  simulation was the  production of 'match 
lists' ( l i s t s  of t rave l l ing  companions) f o r  each o f t h e  1688 
applicants. In  t h i s  pivotal  run, t he  production of match l is ts  f o r  a l l  
1688 applicants was effected i n  one batch. The search f o r  potent ia l  
partners w a s  carr ied out using the  sp i r a l - e l ip t i ca l  routine which terminates 
i t s  search when the  implied extra diversion for the  dr iver  reaches $ of h i s  
journey t o  work distance. The routine was constrained t o  r e j ec t  partners 
whose work hours were not within hour of those of the  applicant i n  question. 
U p  t o  10 potent ial  partners were sought for  each applicant. 
The matching process managed t o  produce match l ists for  94% of the  
applicants. The average number of potent ial  partners on each match l is t  was 
6.76. The computing costs of the  matching process were about £15, ( a t  
commercial r a t e s  as charged by Leeds University). 
Table 3.2 DESCRIPTION OF APPLICATIONS MADE I N  PIVOTAL MODEL RUN. 
* note t h a t  s t a t i s t i c s  r e l a t i ng  t o  _applications w i l l  not necessari ly be equivalent t o  those for_applicants 
because each applicant may make more than one application. 
2 
average 
journey 
length of 
applicants 
(kms) 
10.66 
10.28 
9.86 
4.02 
7.78 
5.55 
3.61 
9.19 
type of application 
L 
t o  poal (a l te rna te  driving) 
t o  drive - morning and evening 
t o  dr ive - mornings only 
t o  drive - evenings only 
t o  r ide  - mornings and evenings 
t o  r ide  - mornings only 
t o  r ide  - evenings only 
any type of application* 
Number of applications 
from 
previously 
solo 
dr ivers  
292 
248 
143 
3 
62 
24 
0 
772 
from 
previously 
accompan'd 
dr ivers  
146 
108 
31 
3 
- 
- 
- 
288 
from 
previous 
passen- 
gers 
31 
1 4  
1 
0 
50 
6 
2 
104 
from 
previous 
public 
transport 
users 
71 
1 5  
1 3  
0 
415 
82 
16 
612 
from 
previous 
other 
mode 
users 
5 
1 
9 
0 
34 
5 
0 
54 
Total  
545 
386 
197 
6 
561 
117 
18 
1830 
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3.5 The decisions t o  form arrangements 
3.5.1. The f i n a l  stage i n  the  simulation was t h e  decision by each of t h e  
applicants who received a match l is t  whether or not t o  form a car  sharing 
arrangement with any of t h e  people on h i s  l i s t .  A description of those 
people who did decide t o  enter  an arrangement i s  given i n  column 3 of 
tab le  3.1. It i s  in te res t ing  t o  compare t h i s  column with t h e  preceding 
ones which describe the applicants and the ta rge t  population respectively.  
Among other features  we note the  following: 
- 327 people actual ly  entered car sharing arrangements (= 19% of 
applicants o r  1.5% of the  ta rge t  population) . 
- 
'Technical/clerical '  workers and persons between 30 and 50 years 
old were marginally more successful i n  finding compatible car sharing 
partners than were other people. 
- If we consider the  previous modes of t r a v e l  of applicants and successful 
par t ic ipants ,  we note tha t  people previously t rave l l ing  by car  were 
l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  f ind  sui table  t rave l l ing  partners than were those who 
previously used public transport .  (This i s  ref lected i n  t h e  higher 
success r a t e  for  people from non-car-owning and non-telephone-owning 
households ) . 
- It i s  something of a surpr ise  t o  note t h a t  the  mean t r i p  length of 
successful par t ic ipants  is  longer than t h a t  of applicants.  Presumably 
the geometrical re la t ionship (which ensures t h a t  t h e  grea te r  the  
journey distance then the  l e s s  the  probabili ty of finding a near 
neighbour with the  same workplace), is swamped by the  grea te r  
enthusiasm of long distance t rave l le rs  fo r  car sharing. 
- People who t r ave l  i n  t h e  main peak periods are  more l i k e l y  t o  f ind  
compatible t rave l l ing  companions than a r e  those with more eccentric 
work hours. The reason for  t h i s  i s  obviously t h a t  they have more 
potent ia l  partners t o  choose from. 
3.5.2 Table 3.3 compares applications made with arrangements eventually 
formed. The t ab le  is  disaggregated by the  type of arrangement and t h e  
previous mode of t h e  par t ic ipant .  From t h i s  t a b l e  it is  apparent t h a t  
lift requestors a re  s l i gh t ly  more l i k e l y  t o  be sa t i s f i ed  than a r e  l i f t  
offerers.  Applicants for  car pooling (a l te rna te  driving) a r e  s ign i f icant ly  
l e s s  l i k e l y t o  be sa t i s f ied .  Persons wishing t o  r i d e  o r  drive fo r  only 
one journey per day are  l e s s  Likely t o  be successFul than those wishing 
for  two journeys per day ( the  evening only applicant is  pa r t i cu la r ly  
- 
unlikely t o  succeed)? Persons who were previously 'other mode' users 
Table 3.3 Successful. participants per 100 applications made 
Type of arrangement 
Pooling 
Drive - morning and 
evening 
Drive - morning only 
Drive - evening only 
L 
Ride - morning and 
evening 
Ride - morning only 
Ride - evening only 
Any type of 
arrangement 
Total 
9 
23 
10 
9 
25 
24 
2 
18 
Previous mode of travel 
Solo driver 
9 
23 
10 
3 
28 
25 
- 
16 
Accompanied 
driver 
8 
27 
10 
11 
- 
- 
- 
16 
Car 
passenger 
8 
17 
- 
- 
26 
26 
- 
19 
Public 
transport 
11 
11 
9 
25 
23 
3 
22 
Other 
- 
- 
12 
- 
15 
28 
- 
14 
- 18 - 
seem par t icu la r ly  unlikely t o  be suff ic ient ly  pleased with any of t h e  
arrangements offered t o  them t o  cause them t o  become car  sharers.  
Persons who previously t rave l led  by public t ransport  however, appear 
more l i k e l y  t o  be sa t i s f ied .  (Previous public t ransport  users  make up 
35% of applicants but 41% of par t ic ipants ) .  
3.5.3 Table 3.4 shows, for  applicants and f o r  successful  par t ic ipants ,  
t he  re la t ionship between t h e i r  distance t o  work and t h e i r  type of application.  
Table 3.4 DISTANCES TO WORK (KMS) - APPLICANTS AND PARTICIPANTS. 
We note t h a t  pooling i s  characterised by the  longest dis tances  and 
r id ing  by the  shortes t .  Arrangements for  only 1 journey per  day a r e  
generally preferred by people with much shorter journey dis tances .  When 
t h e  matches are  actual ly  made we f ind t h a t  long distance t r a v e l l e r s  
are  more successful overal l  and par t icu la r ly  within pools. The very 
short distance t r ave l l e r s  requiring arrangements f o r  only one journey 
per day tend not t o  be sa t i s f ied .  
type of application 
pooling 
driving - mornings and 
evenings 
driving - mornings only 
driving - evenings only 
r id ing  - mornings and 
evenings 
r id ing  - mornings only 
r id ing  - evenings only 
a l l  types of application 
applicants 
10.66 
10.28 
9.86 
4.02 
7.78 
5.55 
3.61 
9.10 
I 
successful  
par t ic ipants  
14.10 
10.58 
10.21 
8.10 
8.13 
4.83 
5.70 
9.26 
3.5.4 We must now consider the overall impact on the transport system of the 
organised car sharing scheme here modelled. The following results are of 
particular interest: 
- The work journey modal split (AM peak) of the target population 
changes from 46.35% private car to 47.02% private car. 
- The demand for city centre oar park spaces falls from 6981 to 
6957 (24 fewer spaces are required - a reduction of 0.34%). 
- The weekly peak period work trip public transport patronage falls 
- 
by 10,708 passenger kilometres from 600750 to 590042 - a reduction 
of 1.78%. 
- The weekly peak period work trip ppivate vehicle kilometres travelled 
falls by 1423 kilometres from 453,896 to 452,473 - a reduction of 0.31%. 
Clearly the effect of this car sharing scheme on the transport system is 
marginal. Its most significant effect is the reduced demand for peak period 
public transport. 
3.5.5 !hrning from this global summary of the scheme's effect on the transport 
system to a more detailed analysis of the matches actually made, we find the 
following points of particular interest. 
- Of total participants who actually join schemes; 52% are 
fee paying passengers, 33% are fee paid drivers and only 
15% are true poolers (alternate driving - riding). We 
also find that 85% of aggreements are for two journeys per 
day. 
- 54% of poolers, 63% of paid drivers and 13% of paying 
passengers were previously solo drivers. 
- 15% of poolers, 3% of paid drivers and 74% of paying 
passengers were previously public transport users. 
- Mean car occupancies within true car-pools and simple 
lift giving arrangements are 2.01 and 2.57 persons/car 
respectively. The comparatively low occupancies within true 
car pools is a result of the much lower probability which a 
driver has of finding two other drivers (whose home and 
work locations are such that any of the three could 
conveniently give a lift - to the other two) than he has of 
finding two passengers whom he could pick up en route to 
work. 
- The arrangements contracted involve 1 5  cars which were 
previously unused ( 9  of these a re  required by new car poolers 
only on those days when they ac t  as driver i n  t h e i r  pool) .  
- The arrangements contracted ' l ibera te '  47 cars which a r e  no 
longer required (23 of these are l iberated by new car poolers 
and are  therefore available only on those days when not 
required within the  pool). 
- t he  arrangements contracted l ibe ra t e  17 cars i n  households 
where there a re  more drivers than cars ( 6  of these a re  
l iberated by new car poolers).  
- !the net  reduction in  private  vehicle usage of 1,423 kilometres 
per  week is  due almost en t i r e ly  t o  pooling arrangements (within 
simple l i f t  giving mmgements  increased use by drivers is almost 
exactly o f f se t  by reduced use by passengers). 
- The l i f t  giving arrangements contracted involve a t ransfer  
of u t i l i t y  uni t s  frum passengers t o  t h e i r  dr ivers .  I n  
monetary terms the  average driver receives £3.75 per week 
(= 3.7 pence per kilometer t ravel led)  and each passenger 
gives £2.39 per week (= 2.98 pence per kilometer ca r r i ed ) .  
The r a t e s  per kilometer t ravel led for  arrangements involving 
only one journey per day a re  about 40% higher than for  
arrangements involving two journeys per day. 
- The t o t a l  u t i l i t y  ( t o  par t ic ipants)  of matches made i s  
£53'7 per week." 
- The u t i l i t y *  per person averages £4.71 fo r  each pooler and 
£1.16 per par t ic ipant  i n  simple l i f t  giving schemes. 
- Diversions t o  pick up passengers cause the  average pooler 
t o  drive an extra  4 kms. ( 2  kms. morning and 2 kms. evening) 
on each day t h a t  he i s  t he  driver - t h i s  represents an increase 
of about 14% on h i s  distance t ravel led on those days. 
- Diversions t o  pick up passengers cause the  average paid 
driver t o  drive an extra  2 kms ( 1  km morning and 1 km evening) 
each day - t h i s  represents an increase of about 11% on h i s  
daily distance travelled-. ( I t  i s  part ly  as a r e su l t  of these 
massive diversions t h a t  the  net reduction i n  vehicle usage is  
so small). 
* This u t i l i t y  being the  excess of what par t ic ipants  would have been 
will ing t o  pay over what t h q a c t u a l l y  did have t o  pay. 
3.5.6 The policy implications of this pivotal model run will, no doubt, already 
be forming themselves in the minds of the perceptive reader. Before considering 
these implications, however, we will present the results of the other model 
tests. Discussion of policy issues is reserved for section 8 of this paper. 
4. THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
4.1 Introduction 
The tests included under this head were designed to investigate the 
sensitivity of model predictions to in certain model assumptions: 
1. That the model of propensity to make an application should 
be calibrated on positive answers to the question "would you 
make use of an information system . . . . ' I  which was posed in 
our field survey (see Bonsall 1979a). An alternative 
assumption (tested here) is that we should assume applications 
from any eligible person expressing any interest at all in car 
sharing. 
2. That we should disregard applications from people who appear 
unable to participate in the scheme in the stated manner 
( - eg because they have no car and yet are offering to give 
lifts). We will here test the effect of accepting all 
applications even if the applicants appear ineligible. 
3. That the calibration of match utilities should be based on 
data from all respondents. We will here test the effect of 
excluding data which appears counter-intuitive (see Bonsall 
19791, pp .34-36) . 
4. That the calibration of match utilities is best carried 
out on a transformed data set in order to maximise normality. 
We will here test the effect of not transforming the data, (see Bonsall 19761- 
section 3.3.3).  
5. That a mechanism should be built into the microsimulation 
program to set counter intuitive valuations of match utility 
to zero (~onsall 1979b pp. 36-39). We will here test the 
effect of omitting this mechanism. 
6.  In the pivotal run it was assumed that passengers would be willing 
to compensate their drgvers with an amountV as @sat as their perceived 
utility of receiving the lift. /We will here test the assumption. that 
no passenger would be prepared to pay more than the bus fare. 
-. 
* This compensation, although here expressed as a transferal of money 
might in practice involve gifts in kind or (rather difficult for us 
to quantify) friendship. 
4.1.2 A sensitivity analysis was also carried out to examine the impact on 
model results of the order in which bargains are struck in the simulation model 
(see Bonsall 1979b, p.18). This analysis involved running the model five times 
with all inputs held constant except the random number string which determines 
the order in which bargains are struck. The conclusions from this test were 
that chang-ing the order in which bargains are struck has a very masginal (e %) 
effect on model results. This conclusion being arrived at from inspection of 
the variances. Nevertheless, it remains quite probable that significant changes 
in system performance would result from a careful arrangement of the order in 
which bargains are struck. (A complex ordering might be devised in order to 
aim for a wstem optimum). However such an arrangement would not occur by chance 
on the field and is unlikely to be attempted as a matter of strategy. Its 
investigation and testing is therefore not warranted at the present time. 
4.2 Results 
Table 4.1 contains a summary of the results of the six tests described above. 
The table enables comparison of the value of each indicator from a given test 
with its value in the pivotal run. We will now consider the results of each 
test in turn. 
4.2.1 The first test (propensity to apply calibrated on respondents expressing 
any interest at all in car sharing) results in a 17% inorease in the number of 
applicants. This increase is most -ked among people wishing to give lifts 
(because it is they who, in the survey, were particularly keen to make their 
own arrangements rather than to use a matching system). 
The 17% increase in applications results in a 19% increase in participants 
(because the larger number of applicants allowed the matching system to work more 
efficiently). 
The increased number of particripants is associated with further reductions 
in demand for parking spaces, for peak ~eriod public transport and private vehicle 
kilometres travelled (w) . 
The less rigorous definition of 'applicants' within the calibration results 
in a lower mean trip length for applicants and for participants. The lower 
mean utilities and compensations result from the lower mean trip lengths and 
the increased number of drivers (reducing their competitive position and hence 
the compensation which they are offered). 
Indicator 
I value of indicator far: I 
p-
I 
Pivotal Test Test Test Test Test Test Pivotal run with ! 
run 1 2 3 4 5 6 confidence interval I 
added subtracted I 
total applicants 1 1688 
applications for pooling 1 545 
applications to give lirts I 589 
applications to receive lifts 1 696 
number of successfxl participants 1 327 
% of applicants who previously used 
public transport 
mean distance to work of applicants (kms) 
number of participants in car pools 1 49 
35.07 
9.10 
number of participants giving lifts 1 109 
number of participants receiving lifts 1 169 
mean car occupancy with arrangements 1 2.45 
mean distance to work of participants (kms)l 9.26 
number of cars 'liberated' in households 
with more drivers than cars 1 17 
number of participants who previously 
dmve solo 
number of participants who previously 
used public transport 
net reduction in daily demand for 
parking spaces ( 24 
120 
135 
mean diversion experienced by participants 
(a. per week) 
reduction in demand far peak period public 
transport (pa~s.kms.~er wcekl 
net reduction in peak period use of 
vehicles (kms. per week) 
campensation offered to aversge driver _ 
giving lifts morning and evening 
a) pence per week 
11.82 
10708 
1423 
b) pence per km, 1 3.70 
These indicators will 
be unchanged for tests 
3-6 because these tests 
do not involve rerunning 
the model which simulates 
the decisions to m a k e  
applications 
total net utility of the scheme to 
participants ( C  per week) 
mean utility of the scheme to each 
participant (pence per week1 
537 
164 
4.2.2- The second test (propensity to make an application calibrated on 
respondents' stated desire to use a matching system even if the respondents 
appeared ineligible to make an application of that tme) resulted in a 34% 
increase in applicants. Particular increases are apparent among would-be 
poolers (6246) and would-be lift givers (41%) because it is amongst these that 
the eligibility constraint is most significant. 
The j@ increase in applicants grows to a 3996 increase in participants. 
The 8096 increase in successfil poolers reflects the importance of having an 
adequate population for the matching system to work effectively. 
The number of car park spaces saved, cars liberated and peak period private 
vehicle kilometres saved all increase by at least 100%. Reduced demand for 
peak period public transport, on the other hand, increases by only 15% - 
this obviously reflects the reduced proportion of applicants who previously 
relied on public transport. 
The reduced mean rates of compensation reflect the increased number of 
would-be drivers (-+ reduced competitive position). 
4.2.3 In the third test (match utilities calibrated on a data set from which 
counterintuitive values have been removed), we find a 23% increase in the number 
of suocessful participants. 
Mean diversions within arrangements are increased and this contributes to 
a less marked reduction in peak period VXT. 
There is an increased reduction in demand for peak period public transport 
but a reduction in the number of park* spaces saved. 
4.2.4 In the fourth test (match utilities calibrated without normalisation prior 
to the regression), we find a 21% reduction in the number of successful participants. 
Participants have lower mean trip lengths. The reduction in demand for 
peak period public transport is less marked as is the saving in VXT and parking 
spaces. 
4.2.5 In the fifth test (evaluation of match utilities not subject to a sieve 
for counter intuitive valuations), we find a 33% increase in the number of 
participants. 
There is a higher proportion of true car pooling. The reduction in peak 
VKT is up 147% and there is a corresponding doubling in the number of parking 
spaces saved. There is only-a 21% increase in the reduction of demand for peak 
period public transport. 
4.2.6 In the sixth test (compensation greater than bus f.we not allowed for), 
we find a 1% reduction in the number of participants. 
Car occupancies are up because fewer drivers feel that they get 
sufficient compensation to carry only one passenger). 
Sav- in peak VRC are increased by 2O0A and the reduction in demand for 
peak period public transport is 10% less. 
The mean net utility to participants is increased because the reduced 
compensation (not included as a net utility because it is a transfer payment) 
does not tempt drivers to give lifts which are particularly irksome to them. 
4.2.7 %,ving considered each of the six sensitivity tests in turn we will now 
compare the magnitudes of their impacts with one another and with the 9% 
confidence interval on the pivotal model run. (column 9 in table 4.5 shows 
for each indicator the mean value from the pivotal nul -the confidence 
interval while column 10 shows the result of subtracting the confidence interval 
from the mean value). 
We find that the number of participants varies from 455 (test 2) to 257 
(test 4) whereas the 90% confidence interval on the pivotal run gives a variation 
from 348 to 306. 
The number of true poolers varies from 124 (test 5) to 42 (test 6) - (pivotal 
run 9% confidence range = 59 to 39). 
Cars liberated for possible off peak use varies from 38 (test 5) to 15 
(test 6) - (pivotal run 90% confidence range 20 to 15). 
Peak VHC saved varies from 3518 (test 5) to 648 (test 3) - (pivotal run 9096 
confidence range 1835-1 01 2) . 
Reduction in peak period public transport patronage (pas kms per week) 
varies from 14250 (test 3) to 8043 (test 4) - (pivotal run 9% confidence. range 
I 1338 to 10077). 
Reduction in d d  for parking spaces varies from 62 spaces (test 2) to 
15 spaces (test 4) - (pivotal run 90% confidence range 28 spaces to 21 spaces). 
The conclusion from this analysis must be that certain of the model results 
are very sensitive to the model assumptions tested here. We must draw particular 
attention to the results of tests 4 and 5. Clearly there is a case for examining 
in more detail the whole question of the calibration of match utilities if we 
wish to reduce the margin of error of the model. 
- 
Table 4.2 Global r e s u l t s  of s ens i t i v i t y  analyses ( fo r  description of t e s t s  see section 4 .1 )  
' 
IU 
0\ 
I 
I 
Indicator 
applications as  a % of t a rge t  
population 
successful par t ic ipants  as  a % 
of ta rge t  population 
% of pierticipants who previously 
used public transport  
peak period work t r i p  VKT per week 
reduction i n  peak VKT as  a % of 
t he  'before' t o t a l  
peak period work t r i p  public 
t ransport  patronage (pass.kms/week) 
reduction i n  peak public t ransport  
usage as  a % of t h e  'before' t o t a l  
car  parking spaces required (per  day) 
reduction i n  park space requirement 
as  a % of t he  'before' 
modal s p l i t  ( %  private)  
- 
value of 
indicator 
before 
introduction 
of t h e  
scheme 
- 
- 
- 
453896 
- 
600750 
- 
6981 
- 
46.38 
Pivotal  Pivotal  
run plus run minus 
confidence confidence 
interval  i n t e rva l  
pivotal  run) 
1 . 6  1 . 4  
4 1  41  
452061 452884 
0.40 0.22 
589412 590673 
1.89 1.68 
6953 6960 
0.40 0.30 
47.06 46.97 
Pivotal  
run 
7.94 
1.5 
41  
452473 
0.31 
590042 
1.78 
6957 
0.34 
47.02 
value of indicator i n :  
-- 
Test Test Test' Test Test Test 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
9.30 10.69 (not dif ferent  from the 
1 .8  2.1 1.9 1.2 2.1 1 .3  
42 39 44 41  36 42 
452368 540886 453248 452608 450378 452185 . 
0.34 0.66 0.14 0 . 2 8 ,  0.78 0.38 
588566 588374 586500 592707 587783 591188 
2.03 2.06 2.37 1.34 2.16 1.59 
6953 6918 6963 6966 6932 6957 
0.40 0.90 0.26 0.21 0.70 0.34 
47.15 47.24 47.25 46.89 47.13 46.92 
4.2.8 Having considered the absolute magnitude of differences between the various 
sensitivity tests it is now important to put these differences in a proper 
perspective. Table 4.2 shows values for some of the systq indicators which 
have particularly strong policy implications. 
The Table shows how these indicators vary with each of the tests and allows 
comparison with the situation before the introduction of an orwised car sharing 
scheme. The last two columns in the table show the range of values that fall 
within the 9096 confidence interval for the pivotal run. 
- 
From this table it is quite clear that the results of all the sensitivity 
tests are very close to that of the pivotal run: 
The application rate approximates to I&. 
The participation rate to somewhat under 2%. 
About 4096 of participants previously used public transport. 
The reduction in VKT is considerably less than 1%. 
The reduction in peak public transport patronage approximates to 2%. 
The reduced demand for parking spaces is less than 1%. 
........and so on. 
Clearly none of the sensitivity analyses have caused a significant change in 
the variables which are most likely to be used in policy formulation. 
5. TESTS OF TBF: ORGBMSATIONAL SWUCICURE OF CAR SHARING SCHEMES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this group of tests we analyse how the performance of the car pooling 
scheme under investigation is affected by the procedures adopted during the 
formation of match lists. The procedural parameters tested here are: 
The maximwn number of potential partners to be included on any 
applicant's natch list, and 
the size of the 'time window1 used in searching for prima-facie matches. 
5.2 Results 
Table 5.1 shows how certain important indicators are affected by changes 
in the maximum number of people on each match list and in the extent of the 
timeband within which the searoh for potential matches is made (Figmes 5.1 and 
5.2 show graphical representations of these). 
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5.2.1As expected, reducing the maximum number of people on the match list 
decreases both the effects of the car sharing scheme and its cost of operation. 
We note (with reference to Figure 5 , l )  that the reduction in costs tends to 
decelerate as we reduce the maximum number of persons per form (the cost difference 
between 7 and 5 is greater than between 3 and 1) while the reduced effectiveness 
of the scheme tends to accelerate. If we were concerned only with maximising 
the cost effectiveness of the matching system then clearly we will decide that 
the optimum maximum number of persons per form is between 3 and 5. In practice, 
however, the overall costs of a car sharing scheme will be dominated by staffing 
and publicity costs which are not proportional to the number of persons on a 
match list. When these costs are included the optimum number of persons per 
match list will rise from about 4 to about 10 (the precise number will obviously 
depend on the costs of publicity and staffing mangements). 
5.2.2 In examining the effect of extending or contracting the width of the 
time band within which the search is conducted (i.e. Figure 5.2) we note, with 
no surprise, that the measures of scheme impact (curves A to D) show decreases 
when the time band is contracted and increases when it is expanded. We note 
also that the reduction in cost (curve E) obtained by searching in one time 
band only is less than the consequently reduced effectiveness of the scheme 
(-es A, B, C and D). The increased costs incurred when 2 time bands are 
used are greater than the increased effectiveness except in respect of reduced 
VBP ( m e  c). In terms of cost-effectiveness, therefore, the optimum time 
window will approximate to* l k$time band unless savings in VFT are thought 
to outweigh all other benefits of organised car sharing - if such be the case 
then a wider time window is to be preferred. 
6. TESTS OF SCHEME LOCATION BND IPENSITY 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1 .I Our first gcoup of tests under this heading was designed to investigate 
how the performance of a scheme is related to the characteristics of the target 
population. We tested schemes within which the target populations vary in 
size, location and composition. Schemes were tested for eight target 
populations (coded A-H) : 
A - city centre offices 
B - inner suburb industrial 
C - outer suburb industrial employment based 
D - inner suburb industrial 
E - mid suburb industrial 
F - Garforth 
H - Otley 
I 
G - Hamogate/~(naresboro~ commuter oriented 
6.1.2 In our second group of tests we investigated how the performance of 
the scheme is affected by the strength of the public's reaction to a call 
for applications. (The strength of this reaction may result from variations 
in the intensity of any attendant publicity campaign but a discussion of this 
question is beyond the scope of the present paper). In this soup of tests 
we are particularly interested in the relationship between the m b e r  and type 
of applications received and the effectiveness of the matching system. 
These tests involved variation in the 'threshold of interest1 which is 
used in the determination of applioations (see sections 1.3 .3 .  and 1.3.4). 
Note that it is not possible to estimate the intensity of publicity campgain 
represented by any given 'threshold of interest1 (except that threshold 8 
represents the level of publicity which accompanied our calibration surveys) 
(see Bonsall 1979a). 
6.2 Descriutions of the Target Pouulations 
Table 6.1 shows the target populations for each of the schemes tested. 
Figure 6.1 shows the location of these populations. 
In comparing the various target population note in particular the following 
points : 
The populations are all considerably smaller than that of the 
pivotal run. 
The Scheme A (city Centre offices) population has a somewhat smaller 
proportion of manual workers and of males. 
The Scheme B (inner suburb industrial) population has a much 
higher proportion of manualworkers, a high proportion of people 
walk- to work, lower car ownership and telephone availability. 
The Scheme C (outer suburb industrial) population has a high 
proportion of males and mauual workers; short journeys to work 
and a consequent high proportion of walking. 
The Scheme D (inner suburb industrial) population differs from 
the other inner suburb industrial population (soheme B) in having 
a very high proportion of females and of 'technical'/clericalt 
employees. This is associated with low licence tenure and car use. I 
The Scheme E (mid suburb industrial) population is werwhelmhgly 
male and mamual, has-short journey lengths and a high proportion 
of walking. 
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All three commuter populations tend to have longer work journeys, 
a higher proportion of males and of car drivers. 
Compared to the other comter populations, that in Garforth 
(scheme F) has a relatively high proportion of females and of 
technical/clerical workers and to have shorter distances to work. 
The ~arrogate/Fhaxesborough commuter population (scheme G) have 
particularly long journeys to work, have few ~technical/clericall 
members, very high licence tenure and car use. 
The Otley cormrmter group (scheme H) has a high proportion of manual 
workers. Its outstanding feature is that it comprises only 521 
individuals. 
The t w e t  population used in the tests of scheme intensity comprises 
2036 work trippers, it differs from the pivotal population in having a 
somewhat higher proportion of manual workers, males, people over 50 and 
users of public transport. Work journeys are somewhat shorter, licence 
tenure, phone ownership and car availability are also lower than that 
of the pivotal population. 
6.3 Results of. Tests of Scheme Location 
Table 6.2 summarises the tests of scheme location. 
6.3.1 Note that the target populations for the employment based schemes vaxy 
from just over 1200 to almost 5,000. None of the employment based schemes 
approach the success rate (successful participants per 100 members of the target 
population) achieved in the pivotal run. This is due in part to the lower 
application rates (8.0 per 100 in the pivotal run and between 5.6 and 7.8 in 
the test schemes), but more particularly it is due to the lower matching 
rates (% of applicants for whom potential partners are found). The matching 
rate, which is 9496 in the pivotal run, varies from 36% to 79% in the test 
schemes. These much lower match rates cannot but reduce the effectiveness 
of the schemes. The lower match rates are clearly a function of the size of 
the target population. In the employment based schemes here tested the 
residential catchment area of the various schemes is similar in extent to 
that of the pivotal scheme but the density of employees within that area is 
considerably less; these lower densities obviously reduce the chances of 
finding potential partners. 
- 
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Overall it is clear that the smaller the scheme then the lower will 
be the matching rate. We note, however, that the matching rate for scheme C 
is the lowest although it is not the smallest scheme. This is due to the 
exceptionally low mean trip length of workers and applicants from scheme C. 
Short journeys to work combine with low residential densities to reduce the 
matching rates. 
6.3.2 The perfomanoe of the commuter oriented schemes follows a rather 
different pattern. The longer average work journeys within the target 
population result in higher application rates (as high as 25 per 100 in scheme G). 
The matching rates are also much higher than for the employment based schemes 
because of the 'durn bell' distribution of homes and workplaces of the applicants, 
(notice the distributions of homes and workplaces for schemes F-H in Figure 6.1). 
The overall success rates of these commuter oriented schemes compare well 
with that of the pivotal scheme - the pivotal scheme's rate was 1.5, that of 
scheme F was 1.3, that of H was 2.5 and that of scheme G a staggering 5.4. 
Once again we note that the performance of scheme F is held back by its having 
a shorter average journey to work than the other two schemes. 
6.3 3 Closer examination of the performance of the individual schemes reveal 
several additional interesting features, among whioh we note the following: 
- Application rates are well correlated with the mean work journey 
lengths of the target population. 
- Several of the schemes actually result in increased peak period VI(T 
(this increase is, however, infinitessimal when compared to the 
total peak period VI(T within the target population). Unfortunately 
there is no clear relationship between quantifiable characteristics 
of the target population and the tendency of some oar shasing schemes 
to have an adverse effect on W. (Further research is probably 
warranted on this question). 
- Reduction of demand for peak period public transport is most marked 
on longer routes because car sharing per se is more successful 
on longer routes). 
- Careful choice of soheme location with respect to oharacteristics of 
the target population can profoundly affect the perfomance of the scheme - 
compare the performance of saheme G with that of scheme E (which is 
of similar size) or with the pivotal scheme which is 13 times the size. 
- 
- The effectiveness of scheme G is demonstrated by the calculation 
that it results in a 3.H reduction in demand for peak period public 
transport (1.7% unpivotal run), a 1 .& reduction in peak VRP (0.3 in 
pivotal run) and a 1.4% saving in parking spaces (0.3% in the pivotal m). 
6.4 Results of Tests of Scheme Intensity 
Table 6.3 summarises the results of the tests of scheme intensity. (The 
first column contains a description of the target population, for ease of 
reference). - 
6.4.1 Examination of the characteristics of the applicants in each test shows 
some clear trends. As the tthreshold of interest1 increases (i.e. as the 
intensity of the scheme decreases) we find that the number of applicants declines* 
and their characteristics alter. We find an increasing proportion of males, 
professional workers, long distance commuters, licence holders, phone owners 
and persons who previously drove to and from work alone. Conversely we find 
a decreasing proportion of manual workers, people over 50, people without access 
to a car and people who previously travelled to work by public transport. This 
change in the characteristics of the applicants is reflected in a decreasing 
proportion of applications to receive lifts and an increasing proportion of 
would-be poolers. 
It thus appears that the more intensive the scheme the more persuasive 
the publicity?) the less exclusive in both senses of that word, it becomes. 
These tendencies are, of course, a function of the differeing propensities which 
people of different characteristics have of applying to join a car sharing scheme - 
these propensities having been derived in our calibration s m e y  (see Bonsall 1979s). 
6.4.2 We note that as the number of applicants decreases (from left to right 
in Table 6.3), then sotoo does the matching rate ($I of applicants for whom a 
match list can be made). Note, however, that the matching rates achieved with 
the low thresholds of interest aze higher than we would normally expect for 
schemes of this size. This is because the low thresholds have produced a 
population of applicants who have expressed interest in more than one type of 
car sha;r& and their catholic tastes make the matching process easier. It 
is interesting to note that the matching rate reaches a ceiling just above 9596 
however large and catholic the pool of applicants. 
* The rate of this decline is a function of the logit form of the choice model. 
As such it maJr or may not represent realistic rates of change. We are here 
concerned with the effect of-this reduction in interest rather than in the 
reduction itself. 
f The model structure is such that lowered thresholds bring multimode applications 
e.g. for pooling, drivingandriding, whereas more normal thresholds typically 
bring only one mode of application from each applicant. 
Table 6.3 Results of tests of scheme intensity 
f value of indicator for: 
threshold of interest used in 
number of applicants (total) 
number of applicants (as of target 
population) 
I 
indicator 
type of applications made: 
% which were for the pooling ".a. 
5 which were for driving n.a. 
$ which were for riding ".a. 
description of applicants 1 
5 previously public trsnsport users 
% previously solo drivers 
% male 
% 'manual' 
% 'technical' 
. . 
% 'professional' 
mean length of journey to work ( h s )  
~~~~ 
I 
% under 30 
5 30-50 
I over 50 
% phone 
% licence 
target 
population 
/ 
P with no cars available 40 38 31 27 : 11 1 
% with 1 car available 4 9  50 51 55 6 63 . 1 
% with 2+ cars available 11 12 12 1 12 14 
, / 13 26 
total number matched I 
test test zest 
total as a 5 of applicants I 
number of successful participants 
test; test 
number as a $ of target population I 
test 
1 3 4 ' 5  
reduction in peak period YKT 
(per week) I 
6 
reduced demand for peak period public 
transport ( p s s  km. per week) 1 
reduced demand for daily park spaces 
I 
persons per arrangement I 
6.4.3 The higher number of applicants and their gceater catholicisity of 
taste in the low threshold tests brings greatly increased numbers of successful 
participants, and correspondingly larger system effects. 
6.4.4 These measures of the operation and impact of schemes of differing 
intensity clearly show that the mechanisms of orwised car sharing tend to 
magnify the level of interest extant among the target population; that is to 
sa,y that a given increase in the number of applicants and their willingness to 
consider a variety of modes of car sharing, will produce a more than proportionate 
increase in the effectiveness of the schemes. This points to the value of 
publicity and incentives. 
7. THE SCENARIO TESTS 
7.1 Introduction 
In this group of tests we investigate har the performance of the car sharing 
schemes might be affected by major changes in their operating environment. The 
tests included under this head are: 
1. The effect of providing free reserved parking space in city centres 
for members of the scheme. 
2. The effect of a doubling in the real price of petrol. 
3. The effect of a doubling in the real price of public transport (fares). 
4. The effect of a simultaneous increase in the real prices of both petrol 
and public transport. 
5. The effect of enforcing the legal/insurance company stipulations on 
acceptable levels of compensation*. 
7.2 Definition of the Tests 
7.2.1 Tests 1 to 4 involve the recalibration of the model of decisions to 
join a car sharing scheme and some modification to the calculation of match 
utilities. !Che recalibration was on the basis of response to special questions 
in our calibration survey (see Bonsall 1979a). These special questions asked 
respondents whether they would apply to join a car sharing scheme under the 
scenarios postulated. Obviously we must retain a healthy scepticism as to 
the reliability of answers to such speculative questions. 
* This stipulation states that the 'hire and rewardf exclusion on car 
insurance policies. would not be invoked so long as compensation did 
not entail an element of 'profit1 for the driver (see BIA (1978)). 
7.2.2 The modification of the calculation of match utilities for the first 
four of the scenarios was as follows: 
(a) For the test of free reserved parking we assume that half of the drivers 
in the scheme will already have access to the reserved parking and will 
thus not be affected by the availability of this special incentive for 
car sharers. (In the absence of data we chose arbitrarily whether a 
given driver will or will not fall into this unaffected group). For 
those drivers who are affected, we assume that the utility of the arrangement 
will be increased by the total value of parking fees saved. Thus we 
assume that lift givers will perceive their utilities increased by 5 daily 
parking fees per week while poolers, who drive only every other day will 
perceive increased utility of 2$ daily parking fees per week. In the 
test whose results are presented here we assume the daily parking fee is 
20 pence (~ecember 1977 values). We have not attempted to quantify the 
value put by passengers on having a reserved parking space (rather than a 
walk from a bus stop for example) - it would be interesting to test the 
effect of including a benefit this type at a later date. 
(b) For the test of a doubling in the real price of petrol we assume that 
all previous drivers who cease to drive as a result of joining the car 
sharing scheme will have an increase in utility equal to the increase in 
the amount that they would have had to spend on petrol had they continued 
to drive. -st this we assume that all drivers within car sharing 
schemes will perceive an increase in the disutility of having to divert 
in order to pick up passengers. This increaseddisutilitybeing equivalent 
to the increased petrol cost of making that diversion. In the test whose 
results are presented here we assume that the increase in the price of 
petrol amounts to 3.4 pence per kilometre for all drivers (1977 prices). 
(An obvious refinement would be to make allowance for variation in car 
engine size but the necessary data was not available to us). 
(c) For the test of a doubling in the real price of public transport we 
assume that all previous users of public transport, who cease to use it 
as a result of the car sharing scheme, will perceive an imrease in utility 
equal to the increased fares that they would have had to pay had they 
continued to use public transport. In the test whose results are presented 
here we assume that the increase in fares amounts to 3.75 pence per 
kilometre (1977 prices). 
-. 
(6) For the test of a simultaneous doubling in the real price of petrol 
and of public transport we combine the assumptions set out in para.gcaphs 
b and c above. 
Please note that these tests were designed to show how the various scenarios 
would affect the performance of a given car sharing scheme; they do not attempt 
to quantify the effects of any other changes in mode or distribution that the 
scenarios might bring about. 
7.2.3 For the test of enforcing the strictest interpretation of the insurance 
companies undertaking there is a modification to the algorithm within which 
the compensation paid by passengers to their drivers is worked out. This 
modification ensmes that no driver shall receive a total compensation (from 
all passengers combined) exceeding 3.4 pence per kilometre (i.e. average car 
running costs at 1977 levels). Note that this test does not attempt to comment 
on how this regulation would be enforced but merely to comment on its effect 
on the performance of an organised car shasing scheme, if it were enforced. 
Also note that, for this test, we do not attempt to quantify the effect that 
existence of strict enforcement would have on individualst desire to make an 
application to join a car sharing scheme (presumably the effect would tend to 
be depressive). 
7.3 Results 
Table 7.1 summarises the results of all five scemio tests. Clearly 
the tests are quite different from one another in character. 
7.3.1 The free-reserved-parking test results in the greatest number of applicants 
(1 0 .& of the target population compared to 7.9% in the pivotal run and* 8.3% 
in the other scenarios). If we excLmine the chazacteristics of these applicants 
we' find that they include an increased proportion of: 
Non-professional workers (who are presumably less likely to have 
free reserved parking already) 
Women 
Peo~le over 50 
People from small households (not shown in Table) 
Users of public transport and persons seeking someone to give them 
lifts to and from work. (!Phis rather surprising result suggests 
that public transport users m y  be attracted by the idea of reserved 
parking spaces which might lessen their sometimes irksome walk from 
bus stop to workplace. -Also, it might be argued, potential passengers 
might welcome the thought that their presence in someone's car would 
entitle that person to a benefit (free reserved parking) jn return for 
which any free might be waived!). 
- 43 - 
Table 7.1 Results of scenario tests. 
description of applicants: 
X male 
$ 'manual' 
2 'technical' 
2 'profesnional' 
indicator 
5 130 years of age 
% 30-50 years of age 
% >50 years of age 
previous imade: 
2 solo drivers 
$ accompanied drivers 
value of indicator in 
pivotal free petrol public simultaneous insuranct 
run reserved prices transport doubling of company 
parking doubled fares petrol and limit 
doubled fares 
% car passengers 
%.public transport 
number of applicants (total 1688 2176 1769 1761 1784 1688 
number of applicants (as s % 
of target population) 7.9 10.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 7.9 
% with 2 1 boushold car 
wit11 household phone 
% with driving licence 
% needing car for business use 
mean distance to work (lans) 
Description of applications: 
I for true pooling 
% for driving 
% far riding 
I of applications matched 
Number of successful participants . 
(total) 327 453 369 513 554 219 
Number of successful participants : 
(as :% af target population) 1.5 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.6 1.0 
Nubrr of successful participants 
(as 2 of applicants) 
mean car occupancy within 
arrangements 
I of participants engaged in 
true pooling 
% of participants previously solo 
drivers 
I of participants previously 
public transport users 
mean distance.to work of all 
participants (bs) 
reduction in demand for peak 
public transport (pass lOns p-1. v k )  
reduction ns a 2 or syotcnl total 
rcliuction in peck :rcckly VXT 
reauction as a $ of system total 
reduction in demand for daily 
parking spaces 
reduction as n % of system total 
cars 'liberated'.for possible 
-. . 
off pe& use 
total 'utility' of arrangements to 
participants ( C )  
mean utility per participant (El 
mean per lan compensation 'paid' 
to drivers (pence) 
The increased number of applicants is not reflected in an improved 
matching rate because of the imbalance of lift seekers to lift offerers. 
(~lthough the density of applicants per km2 is greater there is actually 
a smaller proportion of applicants whose journeys and tme of application 
are compatible). 
The provision of free-reserved parking spaces results in a 40% increase 
in participants (over the pivotal scheme) but the system effects of this policy 
are rather more complex. The fact that the spaces were available to all 
- 
drivers in the scheme, no matter what their car occupancy, seems to have 
mitigated against high car occupancy and it has indeed declined to 2.29 from 
its value of 2.45 in the pivotal run. While the reduction in demand for peak 
period public transport is 57% greater, the reduction in private vehicle peak 
usage is only 3 of what it was in the pivotal run. Similarly the reduced 
demand for city center parking spaces totals only 2 spaces compared to 24 in 
the pivotal run. 
Clearly the types of arramgements being entered into are quite different - 
there is a m h  higher proportion of true pooling and a reduced proportion 
of lift giving. It is interesting to note that drivers are accepting passengers 
offering lower fees than in the pivotal run - do doubt because the drivers 
are getting some benefit already from the free park spaces. Most interesting 
of all, however, is the increased proportion of participants who were previously 
public transport users. It seems that the car parking incentive has appealed 
to a rather different section of the connuunity than might have been envisaged.* 
7.3.2 The petrol price increase scenario brings about a mall (4.7%) increase 
in applications. The extra applications are particularly forthcoming from 
men, from people over 50 years of age and from people with shorter (sic) work 
journeys than those of applicants to the pivotal scheme. There is a particular 
increase in interest from people wishing to find passengers (~reswnabl~ they 
are hoping for contributions towasds the increased petrol costs). 
The increased number of potential drivers helps to improve the matching 
rate - albeit only mazginally. 
The 4.7% increase in applicants is transferred into a 13% increase in 
successflil participants - due no doubt to the particularly large increase in 
the number of people wishing to give lifts. There is less of a aeductim in 
* It is interesting to comppe this test result with empirical evidence 
from Seattle where 40% of users of a high occupancy vehicle parking preference 
facility were found to have been tempted in from public transport. 
peak period public transport patronage but a considerably increased saving 
in private vehicle usage and in demand for parking spaces. This reflects 
the higher proportion of true pooling and of participants who were previously 
solo drivers. 
Thus it appears that, against a background of increased petrol prices, 
the conventionally expected system benefits of organised car sharing (reduced 
VXT and parking requirement) are more in evidence. Note, however, that even 
with a doubling of petrol prices the net effect of these two is still only 
mginal (a reduction of 1 .I 1% in VXT and of 0.74 in parking requirement). 
7.3.3 The public transport fare increase scenario brings about a 4.3% increase 
in applications. The extra applications are particularly forthcoming from 
women, people over 50 and public transport users. 
The 4.3% increase in applicants becomes a 57% increase in successful 
participants. This high success rate is reflected in increased car occupancies 
and a much greater reduction in peak period public transport patronage. 
There is, however, a reduced saving of car park spaces and the marginal 
reduction in VXT is actually transformed into a marginal increase! 
The fees being offered to drivers within the scheme are much enhanced and 
this reflects the general pattern of great inducement to become a driver which 
results in the poor VKT and park space savings mentioned above. 
Against a background of increased public transport fares, an organised 
car sharing scheme proves a very attractive option to public transport users. 
The reduced demand for work trip peak period public transport is particularly 
marked (3.4%). The savings of VRC or parking spaces, however, are negligible. 
7.3.4 The simultaneous increase of petrol costs and public transport fares 
brings about a 5.6% increase in applicants - a somewhat higher percentage than 
that due to either of the increases separately but certainly not as. great as 
the two increases put together. This suggests that a substantial number of 
people would be persuaded to apply to join a car ehazing scheme by either an 
increase in petrol costs ,r in public transport fares - one might have expected 
the populations affected by these two scenarios to be quite distinct." 
The larger number of applicants allows a more successfiil match rate 
- (94.5%). The increase in successfully matched individuals is, at 69%, very 
significant and is substantially raore than for either the petrol or the fare 
+ This counterintuitive result prompts a reminder that the survey 
questions on which these scenario tests were calibrated were highly 
speculative and are unlikely to be as reliable as the questions on 
which the pivotal model was calibrated. 
increase scenasios separately. The mean car occupancy is increased w e n  
higher %ban under the fare increase scenario. Reduction in demand for peak 
period public transport is substantial but not as great as under the fare 
increase scenario. Similarly the reduced peak period VKC and park space 
requireaents are not as great as under the petrol price increase scenario. 
The high success rate for the car sharing scheme under this scenario 
(2.6% of the target population become participants compared to 1 .5% in the 
pivotal run, 1 .% under the petrol scenario and 2,1% under the fare scenario), 
is attributable to the fact that the participants are clearly motivated to 
save money. In the case of the petrol scenario we found drivers more motivated 
than passengers and vice versa under the fare scenario. 
7.3.5 The scenario under which we assume strict enforcement of the insurance 
companies limits on compensation results in a reduction in participants. 
We also note that mean car occupancies are down (there is little incentive for 
drivers to carry additional passengers if his compensation rates must be divided 
by car occupancy). Also we find a 4096 less reduction in the demand for peak 
period public transport. 
On the other hand, however, we notice a 27% @eater reduction in peak 
VICP. This is related to the lower levels of compensation which lead more 
drivers to become poolers rather than lift givers (the compensation for 
giving lifts being artificially constrained). This switch from lift giving 
to true pooling (alternate driving) is responsible for the greater reduction 
in peak VKC. 
The result of strictly enforcing the insurance compamy limits is thus 
seen to include the, at first sight, contrary elements of reduced car occupancies 
and reduced participation and yet increased reduction in peak Wl!. 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Main Findings 
The tests reported in this paper allow a number of conclusions to be dram. 
The most significant ones are presented below. 
8.1.1 The predictions produced by the microsimulation model are relatively 
stable when the model is subjected to sensitivity analysis. Certainly there is 
no cause to doubt the conclusions presented below. The reason for this 
stability is undoubtedly the microsimulation framework which imposes strong 
and realistic constraints on the actions of individual actors within the system. 
(This fact commends the use of microsimulation models). 
8.1.2 In the absence of any special incentives and with transport costs at 
their 1977-78 levels, it seems that an organised car sharing would draw 
applications from some 8% of city centre workers. This proportion would 
increase if the target population were characterised by higher journey lengths. 
It also appears that populations with high telephone ownership, and a high 
proportion of males produce more applications than do others. Populations 
with a high proportion of manual/shop floor workers produce fewer applications. 
Only 3 of applications are for true car pooling (alternate driving) the 
remaining % being for simple lift giving arrangements. 
Answers to a very speculative question in the surveys suggested that a 
"doubling" of petrol prices or of bus fares would only lead to a marginal 
increase in the number of applications. A policy of free reserved parking 
spaces for car poolers in city centres would (also very speculative) lead to 
applications from 10% of city centre workers (i.e. an increase of 2%). 
8.1.3 The success rate of a matching system (percentage of applicants for 
whom a realistic list of potential partners can be produced) is dependent on 
the number of applicants, their spatial distribution and the relative proportions 
of lift seekers, lift offerers and would-be car poolers. A 94% match rate 
can be expected from a target population of 21,000, in a primarily suburban 
hinterland. With a target population of 5,000 an 80% match rate could be 
expected, target populations of 2,000 and 500 might bring match rates of 6096, 
and 4046 respectively. Below 500 the match rates decline s-ly. 
Concentration on a distinct group of commuters (e .g. from a given dormitory 
town to a given city centre) will result in much higher match rates - a match 
rate of 9696 for a target population of 1,500 can be achieved for a group of 
commuters with average commuter length of 21 kms each way. 
8.1.4 An organised car sharing scheme for a target population of 21,000 city 
centre workers is likely to result in about 1.596 of that population entering 
some form of car sharing mangement. Only some 1596 of these arrangements 
will be true car pools. Something between and 4 of these participants are 
likely to have been previously users of public transport. The expected effect 
on the transport system is a reduction in demand for peak period (work trip) 
public transport of between 1.5 and 2% and reductions in peak period work trip 
VICC and parking space requirement of some 0.3%. 
Figures for a scheme based on a group long distance commuters would be 
more dramatic. Over 5% of commuters could be expected to participate, work 
trip peak period use of public transport would decline by almost 4%, VKIC and 
demand for parking spaces by over 1%. 
There is evidence that, against a background of increased transport costs 
(a doubling in petrol prices and in public transport fares), reductions in 
peak period work trip VKT, park space requirement and public transport demand 
would be twice as great as would be the case without these increases. 
Similarly, an incentive for car sharers, in the form of free reserved 
parking in city centres would seem to result in an increased reduction in peak 
public transport demand but in a very marginal reduction in peak VKT and 
parking space requirement. 
It is clear that an increase in the number of applicants and their willing- 
ness to consider more than one type of car sharing arrangement, will bring 
about a more than proportionate increase in the effectiveness of the schemes. 
8.1.5 It is interesting to compare these model predictions of the performance 
of organised car sharing schemes with such empirical evidence as exists. 
An evaluation of car pooling demonstration programmes in the United States 
(~agmer 1978) concludes that about 16% of employees exposed to intensive car 
sharing scheme publicity made applications to join that scheme. In two pilot 
schemes in West Yorkshire (~onsall 197%) response rates averaged 5% for non 
manual workers. The model prediction of 8% is clearly quite close to the 
British figwce (particularly when it is revealed that the target populations 
for the West Yorkshire pilot schemes had a high proportion of females and short 
journey lengths). The US figme of 16% is high even when the longer journey 
lengths are allowed for. The more intensive publicity campaigns used in the 
US schemes is obviously a factor here. 
In the US schemes it was found that 16% of applicants became car sharers 
as a result of the matching systems. Thus some 2&% of the exposed population 
had become sharers (16% x 16%). Of these it was observed that about 
subsequently+ reverted to their original mode. Thus leaving about 1 .% of 
the exposed population as new sharers. This figure of 1.796 is remarkably 
close to the 1 .% predicted by the model. Similarly, Wagner's estimate of 
a 0.3% savjng in work trip VKT is identical to that predicted by the model. 
Clearly the more intensive advertising used in the US schemes attracted more 
applicants but much of the interest proved ephemeral. 
* It is not clear fromWa.p~rts paper for how long these people were car 
poolers before reverting . to their original mode. Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that they had ceased to pool within the first 6 months. 
The model prediction that some 4096 of sharers would previously have been 
users of public transport is remarkably close to the finding in Seattle where 
40% of users of new priority parlring spaces for high occupancy vehicles were 
found to have been previously users of public transit. 
8.2 Policy Implications 
8.2.1 'I'he major policy conclusion must be that voluntary car sharing schemes, 
even with the provision of parking incentives, will not make a major contribution 
towards reduction in urban congestion or energy use. A significant impact 
of the type of scheme represented here is a reduction in demand for peak period 
public transport - whether this is to be welcomed or not will, of course, 
depend on the ability of transport operations to reorganise their services 
more efficiently - also it will depend on the local conditions - whether the 
peak demand is currently being satisfied and the complex interaction of crew 
and vehicle scheduling for example. Clearly there will be cases where 
reduction in peak demand allows for a more efficient service and other cases 
where it would not. Suffice it to say that this is an impact of car sharing 
which deserves serious attention in the strategic and tactical planning of 
car sharing schemes. 
8.2.2 It is apparent that the impact of a car sharing scheme can be manipulated 
by careful choice of the target population and by adjusting the mix of lift 
giving and true car pooling. Assuming that one wished to maximise reduction 
in VRC but minimise reduction in public transport use. It would not be 
possible to restrict entry to a car sharing scheme to private transport users 
exclusivelfl but it would be possible to aim the publicity at private rather 
than public transport users (application forms might be distributed in car parks 
for example). It would also be possible to exclude lift givmg/receiving 
options from the application form and thus effectively to restrict the scheme 
to true car pooling which has a better record for saving V E C  than does lift giving. 
Conversely, of course, if one wished actively to encowage the reduction in 
demand for peak period public transport, the publicity material and matching 
system could be adapted accordingly. 
8.2.3 It is clear that the impact of a car sharing scheme will vary with the 
size and characteristics of its target population - larger schemes will be 
considerably more effective than smaller ones, conmuter groups will respond 
more readily than will other kroups of workers . . . . . . . . . and so on. 
* A device assumed purely for-the purpose of the theoretical calculations 
performed by Vincent and Wood (1 979). 
Incentives, publicity and other methods of increasing interest in the 
various forms of car sharing offer the potential of greatly enhancing the 
effectiveness of the schemes. 
8.2.4 The model suggests that a matching system ought to provide for up to 
X) persons on each match list and ought to match within a & hour time window. 
If computerised matching is required, theeliptical s,earch routine used in the 
model will prove extremely efficient. 
8.3 Further Research 
8 . 1  The microsimlation model used in the current project has indicated 
the scale of impacts that can be expected from organised car sharing schemes. 
If this result is all that is required by the policy makers then we can say 
the job is done and further work unnecessary. If, however, a greater insight 
is required into the mechanisms and impacts of car sharing then clemly there 
remains mch work to be done. 
8.3.2 The relationship between car sharing and public transport is obviously 
an extremely important issue about which we should wish to know more. The 
current model could be used to explore further the scope for restricting the 
car sharing schemes to car drivers or would-be poolers. It could also be 
used to test the impact of a scheme specifically designed to relieve pressure 
on a particular part of the public transport network. 
A development of microsimlation modelling to explore the link between 
peak period mode choice and off-peak travel patterns is already underway in 
Leeds (SSRC grant) and is designed to contribute to an understanding of the 
relationship between car sharing schemes and use of public transport. 
There is obviously scope for further examination of the behavioural factors 
affecting the choice between a cas-sharing and a public transport journey. 
8.3.3 Clearly there is a need for more detailed investigation of the effective- 
ness of publicity and various forms of incentives in increasing the effect and 
viability of car sharing. 
8.3.4 More information is required about the perfommce and operation of car 
sharing schemes in the field in the UK. Experimental schemes already underway 
in Leeds should contribute useful information as should others being established 
elsewhere. The c&ent model could be used to investigate the trade-offs 
between manual and computerised matching techniques and to provide recommendations 
- 
as to the choice between them. The model could also test the impact of a car 
sharing scheme designed to ameliorate a particular traffic problem - a congested 
corridor for example, or to investigate the effect of additional incentives 
for car sharers - a subsidy from public funds to promote car sharing for example. 
The relationship between car sharing and flexitime c m o t  be realistically 
addressed by the current model but empirical work is already underway in Leeds 
(ssRC @ant) which should help in this respect. 
8.3.5 There is clearly room for further sensitivity analysis of the model and 
improvement in the calibration of the choice models. In particular we should 
investigate further the effects of changing the rationale of the algorithm 
within which the utilities of potential partners are evaluated. Similarly we 
would wish to investigate the effect of the (known) disparities between the 
real population of West Yorkshire and the synthesised one on which all the 
tests were man - a very important issue here, and one which has very wide 
application, is the divergence between data relating to lnormall behaviour and 
the snapshot data from which our population was synthesised. 
The case for these researches must, however, lie outside the context of 
predicting the effect of orgmised car sharing schemes because it is extremely 
unlikely that fmther refinement of the model or its calibration would cause a 
significant change in the model predictions. mere is, however, a case for 
the development of microsimulation techniques in other areas of social science 
research because microsimulation is proving a valuable device for the improvement 
of modelling techniques in the three important areas of prediction, understanding 
and explanation. 
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